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“Having Identified an Utterance . . . ” –
Predication and Interpretation
Štefan Riegelnik
Summary: What is it for predicates to mean what they
do and what is their contribution to the meaning of an
utterance? It is exactly this question to which Davidson
dedicates his book Truth and Predication (2005). Most
commentators focus on Davidson’s discussion of failed
accounts, in particular of Frege’s account. In contrast to
this tendency, I focus here on Davidson’s own account.
The structure is as follows. First, I sketch the problem
of predication and I glance at Davidson’s discussion of
failed accounts. Then I present his solution and integrate
it in his theory of interpretation, thereby bringing out
the particularity of the account. In doing so I shall scru-
tinize some criticisms as well, for as I intend to show,
they originate from a wrong understanding of his com-
prehensive theory of interpretation.
I
A peculiarity of Donald Davidson’s approach towards a unified
theory of interpretation is that he focuses at first on the form
such a theory should take. This leaves open room for the ques-
tion of what conditions a theory of interpretation must fulfil in
order to count as a comprehensive approach. Though it seems to
be obvious that natural languages as the object of examination
determine these conditions, Davidson considers natural languages
as necessarily having certain features to be the object of such an
examination at all. One such feature Davidson accentuates con-
stantly throughout his work is the so-called learnability feature.
The reason for bringing out such a feature is simple: we are born
into this world without linguistic competence and after a while we
are competent speakers of at least one natural language. Theories
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of meaning ignoring this condition are thus to be considered as
a failure from the outset. Davidson suggests “to see the natural
language as a formal system” (Davidson 1970: 55), to reveal as
much structure as possible and to build up a theory on the basis
of the revealed structure. In “Theories of Meaning and Learnable
Languages” he writes “it must be possible to give a construc-
tive account of the meaning of the sentences in the language”
(Davidson 1965: 3). Putting this closer to the way we speak and
avoiding the conflict-laden comparison of natural languages with
formal systems, to give a constructive account means primarily
that we understand an utterance of a sentence on the basis of the
contributions of its parts:
Since there seems to be no clear limit to the number of
meaningful expressions, a workable theory must account
for the meaning of each expression on the basis of the pat-
terned exhibition of a finite number of features. (Davidson
1970: 55)
A second, perhaps more obvious rationale for the introduction
of the learnability condition might be the fact that people do
not normally face problems in understanding utterances of sen-
tences heard or read for the first time. Sticking with the revealed
structure and the idea that parts of sentences contribute to their
meaning, we may carry on to ask in what these contributions
consist. The analysis of a simple predicative sentence like “Jack
is tall” might go as follows: “Jack” contributes to the meaning of
the sentence by naming a person and “tall” contributes by char-
acterizing the person’s height. The concept in order to account for
the contribution in the case of “Jack” is reference or denotation
– but on behalf of what concept shall we explain the contribution
of “tall” or “is tall”? It is true that to characterize characterizes
the usage of predicates, but a mere paraphrase does not seem to
be a substantive advancement here. It is rather – as is often the
case when it comes to explaining the role of predicates – a yet-to-
be-explained metaphor. Thus, what is it for predicates to mean
what they do, or what is their contribution to the meaning of an
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utterance? It is exactly this question to which Davidson devoted
Truth and Predication (hereafter TaP).
II
Broadly construed, the problem of predication consists in explain-
ing the semantical role of predicates. Avoiding any unjustified
anticipations, it consists in explaining the contributions of what
comes after the subject1 term to the meaning of an utterance
of a sentence. Putting hair-splitting aside, the traditional and
ordinary word for what comes after the subject term is “pred-
icate” and I use this term without any particular anticipation.
As Davidson holds, “a grasp of the semantic role of predicates is
central to any account of how sentences are articulated” (TaP:
2), for predicates are the indispensable part of sentences. He puts
the problem into the context of the ancient and mediaeval prob-
lem of universals and traces it back to Plato, who is the main
responsible philosopher for the problem of predication, for “the
theory of forms or ideas led directly to it” (TaP: 77). David-
son admits that nowadays there is a tendency to consider the
problem of predication mainly as a problem in the philosophy of
language (TaP: 77), and he follows this tendency. In light of this,
one might point out that TaP does not deal with a substantive
theory of predication, but with failed attempts. This is partly
true. On the basis of prominent accounts, among them the ac-
counts of Plato, Aristotle, Russell, Strawson, Sellars and Quine,
and with a more benevolent attitude – Frege’s account – David-
son identifies an archetypical error in all their efforts: it consists
in applying the same concept to predicates as to names and sin-
gular terms, namely reference. At first sight this does not seem
to be wrong: even in our ordinary speech we often say that “red”
used in a sentence like “the flag is red” refers to the property
of redness, and who wants to change the way we speak? Surely,
nothing is wrong with the way we speak. But this neither com-
mits us to applying a particular concept in order to explain the
role of predicates nor does the mere postulation of entities such as
1 In most languages the ‘predicate’ follows to the ‘subject’.
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properties etc. constitute an explanation. While one might speak
of “meanings” of uttered sentences in everyday contexts, they are
of no help in the context of theories of meanings (see Davidson
1967 on this). As regards predication and the theoretical notion
of reference, Davidson shows at length in the form of a reductio
ad absurdum that appealing to this concept in order to explain
the semantical role of predicates makes it impossible to explain
the difference between a mere list of names and a sentence, for a
sentence exhibits a unity, which is a condition for sentences be-
ing either true or false. If one insists and tries to get along with
reference – even in different guises –
associating predicates with objects such as universals,
properties, relations, or sets will not solve the problem
because it will always lead to an infinite regress. (TaP:
143)
Thus the problem is not only putting predicates and names on
the same level, but explaining the difference between mere lists
of strings and sentences. In other words, appealing to the notion
of reference exclusively in order to explain all the fragmentary
contributions of names and predicates seems to impede an ex-
planation of the unity of a sentence. Yet it is important to note
that the problem of predication does not consist merely in an
avoidance of problems explaining sentences as unities – and it
is mistaken to read TaP as elaborating on failed accounts exclu-
sively.
III
First and foremost, what we are looking for is an account to
explain predication, or as Davidson asks and analyses:
What is the role of the verb or predicate? If we say it
names or is otherwise related to the property of Sitting,
we have so far pointed to nothing that could be true or
false, for we have simply indicated two entities. Of course
what we want to add is that the sentence is true if and
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only if the entity named has the property: Theaetetus has
the property of Sitting. The little word ‘has’ is the missing
verb: it is a two-place predicate which should, in turn, be
explained by reference to the relation of Instantiation. We
are once more on the regress. (TaP: 87).
The gist of Davidson’s criticism of rival accounts is that if we rely
on the concept of reference or its cognates, we are unable to ex-
plain the unity of a sentence; we would need to postulate an entity
(“glue”) which explains the unity, but we would need to postu-
late a further entity to unite the uniting entity with the referring
parts, and for this we would need to postulate again a uniting
entity, etcetera, etcetera, ad infinitum. Showing how prominent
accounts fall into this trap is Davidson’s leitmotif in Truth and
Predication. Among others (for instance, Pfisterer 2009), Tyler
Burge (2008) criticizes Davidson (besides his sloppiness) for not
having shown conclusively that the regress is invoked. However,
Burge’s review essay covers many points Davidson raises in TaP.
The role of postulations of properties, relations, universals and
Forms, etc. and Davidson’s rejection of them for the problem of
predication get special attention (besides Davidson’s reading of
Frege). Burge argues that Davidson mistakenly puts the regress
on a level with merely mentioning properties, for this does not
necessarily run into the regress. Burge writes about Davidson
that
[h]e believes that many philosophers fell into regresses be-
cause they tried to explain the unity effected by predica-
tion in terms of an ontology of universals and particulars,
or properties and individuals. (Burge 2008: 586)
and more upbraiding
he thinks that taking predicates to bear any semantical
relation to a single entity like a property, relation, uni-
versal, Form, or the like makes no contribution at all to
solving these problems. (Burge 2008: 590)
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Burge agrees that such a postulation of entities does not “in itself
solve” (Burge 2008: 591) the problem of predication, but leaves
open the possibility that postulations of this kind are of some
help. In particular, Burge holds that
[h]e [Davidson] gives no good reason to deny that predi-
cates bear a semantical relation to properties, relations,
or the like. (Burge 2008: 591)
The question, then, is what such a semantical relation of pred-
icates to postulated entities amounts to (if not that between a
singular term and an entity). Even if such a relation is explicable
coherently, it still remains questionable whether it has any ex-
planatory value. Burge ignores the risk of postulating properties
and relations – and holds that even if there are infinite proper-
ties and instantiation, it does not constitute an infinite regress,
but profusion. This kind of criticism is misleading. At the outset,
Davidson is amenable to the postulation of properties:
[t]here is no objection to taking properties and relations
as entities about which we want to think and say things
(TaP 85)
but remains sceptical about whether
positing the existence of properties and relations helps
us to understand the structure and nature of judgments
(TaP 85).
If one follows Burge and ignores the lack of identity criteria of
such postulated properties, what then has to be explained is how
predicates are related to these properties. For obvious reasons,
this kind of relation must be different from the one between names
or singular terms and ordinary objects. Even if one succeeds in
showing this, there still remains the question of how this helps to
understand the role of predicates in sentences. Again we are back
to the question of the role of predicates in sentences.
But a first lesson could be learned from this: the paradigm er-
ror Davidson identifies in failed accounts, then, is, to put it more
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precisely, that what has to be explained are the distinctive con-
tributions of names and predicates to a sentence as a unity. In
order to avoid questions about how sentences should be divided
and what constitutes a sentence’s subject or predicate, I settle
for claiming that the contributions that subjects and predicates
make to the meaning of a sentence have to be distinctive. But this
is not the sole lesson to be learned and it takes us away now from
failed attempts. By dealing with rival theories, Davidson develops
a catalogue of conditions that a satisfactory theory of predication
has to meet. The yet-to-be-found theory of predication (i) has to
explain how “predicates contribute to the truth or falsity of the
sentence in which they occur” (TaP 141), and (ii) has to avoid
the infinite regress which arises if predicates are associated with
“objects such as universals, properties, relations, or sets” (TaP
143). From (ii) follows (iii), i.e. that “it is essential to separate
the obvious observation that predicates introduce generality into
sentences from the thought that predicates must at the same time
introduce universals or other abstract entities” (TaP 145). The
lesson learned consists in the insight that (iv) “the full scope and
nature of the problem of predication emerges only in conjunction
with a clear conception of the logical form of sentences” (TaP
147).
The crucial point for any theory of predication is (iii), for the
introduction of generality is the main contrast to referring terms,
which introduce individuality, i.e. they single out an object. With
these criteria at hand, what is Davidson’s own attempt to solve
the so-called problem of predication bothering philosophers for
millennia?
IV
To readers of Davidson’s earlier works the proposal is not new.
In “Reality Without Reference”, for instance, he writes:
In the case of predicates, Tarski’s method as we know, in-
volves appeal to the concept of satisfaction [my emphasis,
SR], a relation between predicates and n-tuples of enti-
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92 Štefan Riegelnik
ties of which the predicates are true, actually, sequences
of such. (Davidson 1977: 217)
Here Davidson contrasts satisfaction with reference which he
takes “to be a relation between proper names and what they
name” (Davidson 1977: 216). In TaP, Davidson is more explicit:
the role of predicates in sentences ought to be explained by means
of the concept Tarski used for his definition of truth for formal
languages, namely satisfaction, which is pretty much the converse
of the Quinean notion of true of. The concept of satisfaction pairs
objects and so-called open sentences, which are expressions with
free variables. Thus an object satisfies an open sentence if the
resulting sentence becomes a true one. Hence “snow” satisfies “x
is white” because “snow is white” is true, and “grass” does not
satisfy “x is white” because it is not the case that grass is white.
This approach ought to fulfil all the conditions worked out from
the examination of failed accounts: beside the avoidance of the
infinite regress, the most essential one is that the application of
the concept satisfaction links predicates as the essential parts of
sentences to the sentences’ truth, which is the key concept in his
theory of interpretation. So much for the theory.
How convincing is this? First of all, it goes without saying that
satisfaction is a neutral and trivial notion – with the help of it,
the stating of a sentence’s truth condition is uncomplicated and
straightforward. To quote again from “Reality Without Refer-
ence”, where Davidson admits the austerity, i.e. the triviality of
this framework.
When the theory comes to characterize satisfaction for
the predicate ‘x flies’, for example, it merely tells us that
an entity satisfies ‘x flies’ if and only if that entity flies. If
we ask for a further explanation or analysis of the relation,
we will be disappointed. (Davidson 1977: 217)
Tarski himself has often been criticized for the austerity of his
definition of truth. Among his most prominent critics are Max
Black (1949) and Ernst Tugendhat (1976). It seems that even
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Davidson agrees in TaP (and elsewhere, for instance in “Truth
Rehabilitated” (1997)) to such a diagnosis –
Tarski showed how to define a truth predicate for each of
a number of well-behaved languages, but his definitions
do not, of course, tell us what these predicates have in
common. (TaP: 15)
In the same vein one could object that satisfaction pairs objects
and open sentences, but what all these “pairings” have in com-
mon remains unexplained: it is not clear why, exactly, satisfaction
represents a solution to the problem of predication. Hrachovec
(2006) generalizes this kind of criticisms and holds that Davidson
neglects the promise to give a solution for a problem bothering
philosophers since Plato. The question, however, is whether the
problem persists, if, as Davidson writes, “what does emerge is
a method for specifying the role of each and every predicate in
a specific language” (TaP: 161). What should not be neglected
are the advantages of the way to give truth conditions over other
readings of the interdependency of truth and meaning. These ad-
vantages perpetuate to the inner structure of a sentence – which
becomes manifest in the fact, too, that there is no need to postu-
late abstract entities or to appeal to strange apparatuses in order
to explain the semantic roles of predicates.
To put it differently and in a broader way, Davidson seeks to
explain the interpretation of an uttered sentence by taking the
concept of truth as basic – exhibited especially in Tarski’s truth
definition – and to explain the interpretation of an arbitrary sen-
tence by appealing to its truth conditions. Thus it is only con-
sequent to explain predication in these terms, i.e. “to show how
our grasp of the concept of truth can explain predication” (TaP:
161).
However, maintaining that the the sole advantage of this reading
over alternative attempts is the avoidance of difficulties would
leave out a lot. Though it is hard to imagine a more concise read-
ing of the relation between truth and meaning, it goes without
saying that one has to put flesh on the bones of the framework
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94 Štefan Riegelnik
and treat sentence, truth, satisfaction, reference, predication, etc.
in the first place, as argued above, as theoretical constructs with
their assigned roles: these concepts are primarily used to read
structure into natural languages and it is advisable here to take
a step back and integrate the proposed solution in Davidson’s
theory of meaning.
The introduction to the collection of essays Inquiries into Truth
and Interpretation (2001) opens with the question “What is it
for words to mean what they do?” (p. xv). In previous writings
he suggests that:
a theory of truth for a language does, in a minimal but
important respect, do what we want, that is, give the
meanings of all independently meaningful expressions on
the basis of an analysis of their structure (Davidson 1970:
55)
To know the semantic concept of truth for a language is
to know what it is for a sentence – any sentence – to be
true, and this amounts, in one good sense we can give to
phrase, to understanding the language (Davidson: 1967:
24).
The theory of truth Davidson has in mind is, of course, Tarki’s
definition of truth (as laid down in Tarski 1944). What Tarski
did, in short, was to apply the predicate “true” to sentences and
construct a definition of truth with the general form
(T) X is true if, and only if, p
and instances of that such as
(1) “Jack is tall” is true if, and only if, Jack is tall.
On the left side of (T), X is substituted by a structural descrip-
tion or a name of an uttered sentence and the right side states the
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truth conditions of X, which are, or should be, sufficient to un-
derstand X. The attractiveness of giving truth conditions in this
way is that the sentence itself provides all we need: we can free
ourselves from the idea that sentences refer to states of affairs,
facts or other strange entities like The True or The False. And
there is no need to struggle like verificationists with the “essen-
tial incompleteness” (cf. Waismann 1945) of protocol statements.
In addition to these conveniences – and what is of crucial im-
portance in this context here – truth conditions are given on the
basis of the inner structure of sentences, i.e. the semantic fea-
tures of the parts and how they are related. If one admits the
priority of the inner structure of a sentence for its truth, little
can be said against the application of the concept satisfaction in
order to explain how a subject of a sentence is related to a pred-
icate. To summarize the general approach so far – the question
is, how should one explain the meaning of a complex expression
as depending on the contribution of the parts? In a minimalistic
respect – and it has to be elucidated in what respect Davidson’s
theory is minimalistic – Tarski’s truth definition serves this pur-
pose. Tarski’s emphasis on the inner structure of a sentence is
crucial for any account of predication – and it is exactly at this
point where the notion satisfaction and its strength for the ques-
tion of how predicated contribute to the meaning of an utterance
come into play.
It might be retorted that in consideration of the minimalistic
character of Davidson’s solution to the problem of predication,
an application to non-formal languages is a non-starter. Since
even optimists of such an approach concede that fundamental
adjustments are necessary in order to account for particularities
that natural languages implicate, it remains at least questionable
whether Tarski’s machinery represents a suitable starting point
at all. However, it is worth noting that that proponents of of
minimalistic accounts do not provide sound reasons why it should
not be possible to go beyond a certain point, though this might
be a futile endeavour. And it is doubtful whether Davidson’s use
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of Tarski’s truth definition deserves the label “minimalistic” at
all. (I shall not address these points here.)
V
At this stage of the argument, I want to scrutinize some further
criticisms of Davidson’s account of predication. In order to do
this, I go a little further into detail concerning the theory of in-
terpretation Davidson has in mind. This theory has often been
characterized as a double-tracked approach: on the one hand, the
formal apparatus based on Tarski’s definition of truth for formal
approaches plus necessary adjustments in order to deal with in-
dexical expressions and demonstratives; on the other hand, the
empirical part centering around the thought experiment inspired
by Quine, known under the label “radical interpretation”, which
concerns, as well, the characteristics and abilities a radical inter-
preter must have in order to decipher an alien tongue. Interpreters
of Davidson’s philosophy give various reasons for leaving the arm-
chair and “going empirical”. Some try to mitigate shortcomings
in the “formal realm” such as paradoxes (most prominently the
liar paradox). Some look for evidential support to undermine var-
ious criticisms of Davidson’s “austere” solution. Some see radical
interpretation as a playground for anthropological debates. Oth-
ers see radical interpretation as a criterion for (formal) theories of
language to comply with. I think they all expect too much from
such a scenario, but this is not my issue here. More important
is – a feature that all these argumentations have in common –
the supposed division between a formal and an empirical part
of a theory. I agree that for various reasons semanticists should
take the position of a radical interpreter or that of an observer of
a radical interpreter, but this does not necessarily imply a sep-
aration. It is true that theoretical constructs such as reference,
predication, satisfaction, sentence, etc. become secondary in a sit-
uation of a radical interpretation, but this neither means giving
them up entirely nor that they are mere formal devices in need
of empirical completion. The question, then, is how they fit into
the thought experiment radical interpretation.
 - 10.1515/cpt-2010-9604
Downloaded from PubFactory at 09/06/2016 11:57:31AM
via UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
“Having Identified an Utterance . . . ” 97
As regards Davidson’s appeal to truth and satisfaction, Eva Pi-
cardi (2008) argues that
the whole construction would be [. . . ] hanging in the air
unless we were able to show that the concept of truth
is really involved in the practice of speaking a language
(Picardi 2008: 60f.)
What is left untouched by Tarski’s account, she argues, is the
connection between the set of beliefs of an interpreter and truth.
Picardi considers this to be the task of the theory of radical in-
terpretation and she accuses Davidson of not showing that
through this relation [satisfaction, SR] [. . . ] language hooks
upon the world. (Picardi 2008: 60)
What she is missing is “the epistemology of the relation of satis-
faction”.
I doubt that these criticisms are legitimate, for my contention
is this. We do not make use of the concept of truth in order to
explain the workings of natural languages on the basis of em-
pirical observations. The what might be called “interdependency
of truth and meaning” – the basis for a thought experiment like
radical interpretation – consists mainly in the fact that the truth
of a sentence does not depend only on how the world is, but also
on what the words used in a sentence mean. Even the success of
radical interpretation, i.e. the decipherment of an unknown lan-
guage from scratch, does not give us decisive reasons to prefer
one concept to another. The task of a radical interpreter is to
identify utterances as intentional and linguistic and to read as
much structure as possible into the alien’s language by means of
Tarski’s truth theory. On the basis of facts such as the behaviour
of the speaker and the surroundings, the radical interpreter veri-
fies that her T-sentences are true. But this does not impley, too,
as Picardi holds, that the internal machinery is subject to direct
empirical observation. On the contrary, the satisfaction relation
is part of the internal machinery, or rather, it is a device for the
radical interpreter to state the truth conditions of the sentences
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uttered by the speaker, thereby reading structure into the utter-
ances in question. Mutatis mutandis, radical interpretation of an
alien language does not elucidate the concept of satisfaction. But
it is not the aim of the thought experiment to do so at all. Just
as we cannot start with referring terms and base a theory of lan-
guage on them, we cannot start with predicates. It is clear that
this puts constraints on the characteristics and abilities of the
radical interpreter or the person running the experiment. Since
the radical interpreter already knows a first language, concept
formation and concept identification are not at stake here, nor in
need of explanation as demanded by Picardi. Again, we should
not expect too much of empirical observations and the thought
experiment such as radical interpretation – it is, as Davidson puts
it, mainly “a way of studying interpretation by purifying the sit-
uation in an artificial way” (Davidson 1993: 6).
In the context of radical interpretation for which Tarski’s truth
theory is the basis, the problem of predication changes: utterances
are the primary semantic unit and the question now is how it is
possible that utterances are related coherently, which is again a
condition for understanding an alien speaker.
The question here is how sentences are related so that they form
a set of coherent sentences.
“Radical interpretation” (1973) begins with “having identified
an utterance” (125), which means that Davidson considers utter-
ances as the primary semantic unit. On the one hand, this sounds
like a truism, but on the other hand it implies that predicates are
the result of decomposition of an utterance of a sentence. And in
this context, there is just “no empirical content [assigned] directly
to relations between names or predicates and objects” (Davidson
1977: 223). However, this does not relieve us from the task of ex-
plaining the role of predicates and how they are related to names.
IV
It has often been said that Davidson’s solution is a less-is-more
proposal (Burge 2008; Davidson 2005). What does this mean?
Does it mean that the problem or predication as stated in terms
of Plato’s notion just vanishes? Is the main point of Davidson’s
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elaboration really just to present a solution which avoids insolu-
ble problems, viz. infinite regresses? The gist of these questions
is as such: thinkers who are neither convinced of Davidson’s the-
ory of interpretation nor of his reading of the interdependency of
truth and meaning are most likely not convinced of his theory of
predication either. So the question is whether we can give inde-
pendent reasons for why the appeal to Tarski’s truth definition
and to the notion of satisfaction is the proper way to explain the
role of predicates. I give my answer in different terms. David-
son’s approach starts with an elaboration of the conditions that
a satisfactory theory of meaning has to meet. If we agree that
these conditions are best met by a theory of truth, then a further
condition for the very same theory is to explain the contribution
of the parts and how they are related. From this point of view
Davidson’s solution is not a “more-is-less solution” but rather an
“all-in-one solution”.
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